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CHAPTER I . I NTRODUCTION 
The response of commercial banks to changes in moneta ry po l icy 
represe nts a critical component of economic adjustment and control. In 
a simple Keynesian analysis, this response is man i fested in changes i n 
"the" rate of interest. Specifically, when the Federal Reserve restricts 
bank reserves through open- market sales, increases in the discount rate, 
or increases in reserve requirements, banks transfer this restriction on 
lending resources by increasing the loan rate to borrowers. Subsequently, 
this higher interes t rate affects spending decisions , especially those 
related to capital acquisition , and thus affects economic activity . 
More recently, the theory of bank response to tight money has been 
extended by the credit availability doctrine to include non- price char -
acteristics of loans . In 1955 and 1957, the Americal Bankers Association 
(1), (2) conducted surveys which probed the actions of commercial bankers 
in all parts of the country. Participating banks totaled more than 1,400 
and accounted for approximately two- thirds of the total assets of all 
commercial banks. These banks were questioned about increased se l ectivity 
in lending during tight money, the reasons for tightening of bank cred i t , 
and their methods of achieving such restriction . 
The survey indicated that nearly 80% of all commercial banks had 
become more selective in their lending policies during the monetary 
restraint beginning in late 1955 . The severity of selectivity increased 
with deposit size of the banks . Less than 80% of the small banks 
(deposits under $10 million) indicated they had increased selectivi ty 
while over 90% of the large banks (deposits over $500 mil l ion) denoted 
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that they had become more discriminating in their lending policy (2 , p . 69) . 
Of tha bankers who indica t ed they had adopted more conservative 
lending criteria , 44% stressed the decline in bank liquidity (increase in 
loan to deposit ratios) as one of the chief reasons; 44% mentioned concern 
over economic tre nd s as a motivating force; 23% expressed their desire to 
cooperate with Feder al Reserve policy as a determinant of incr eased 
selectivity; and 15% added that a decline in bond prices had caused them 
co become more cautious in making loans (2 , p . 69) . 
Finally , the banks r eported a variety of methods used to accomplish 
increased stringency . About two-thi r ds modified their pract ices through 
stricter credit review; 57% through mor e consideration of past relations 
with loan applicants; 42% by considering the willingness of applicants to 
maintain good balances; 38% by imposing faster r e payment schedules; and 
25% by scaling down of loan requests (2 , p. 70) . 
These two surveys indicate chat bank response and subsequent economic 
adjus tment to tight money are much mor e complex than a Keynesian analysis 
would suggest. If , in general, banks do respond to tight money by 
r a t ioning credit, decisions about debt - financed private spending wil l be 
further complicated . Borrowers who ar e willing to pay the higher interest 
rate brought about by r estricted bank r eserves may now be frustrated by 
these non- price r estraint s . Stated in another way , the depressive effect 
on priva t e spending of loa n rate increases will be reinforced by non-
pr i ce credit rationing. 
Prior to the ABA studies, however , Paul A. Samuelson (20) had argued 
t hat non-price credit rationing will be used only as a t emporary measur e 
J 
while the interes t rate adjusts upward. He contended that no prudent 
banker would sacrifice additional profits from higher interest rates to 
"arbitrarily make trouble for himself" by rationing credit through non-
price criteria (20, p. 696) . 
These two v iews capture the flavor of the controver sy between interest 
rate and credit availability proponents in explicating bank response to 
tight money. Since the Samuelson testimony and ABA studies, various 
theoretical mode l s (22) , (9), (8), (11), (14) describing bank behavior 
have been advanced to support or reject the credit availability doctrine. 
However, empirical evidence is meager . Reasons for the lack of empirical 
evidence include banks ' unwillingness to disclose customer data; loan 
provisions, such as the value of collateral, which are difficult to 
quantify; customer relationships which are difficult to evaluate; and 
qualitative differences among loans. 
The purpose of this study is to provide an empirical evaluation of 
the credit availability doctrine through a case study involving the actions 
of a single bank during the tight money period of the summer of 1966. 
Credit rationing explanations plus theoretical models , representative of 
both the interest rate and credit rationing views , will be presented in 
Chapter II; economic conditions and the position of the bank will be 
reviewed i n Chapter III ; Chapter IV will include the formu l ation and 
testing of credit r ationing hypotheses ; and Chapter V wi ll present and 
discuss the conclusions of the study. 
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CHAPTER II. REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Explanations fo r Credit Rationing 
As th~ credit availability doct r ine gained popularity in thl'.: 1950's , 
v.:irious expl.:rna tions were advanced to justify the commercial b;rnk' s non-
price rationing of credit. These expl anations essentially describe 
influences that central bank policy r estraint has upon the forces moti -
vating bank decision making . Following a re some of the most corrunonly 
mentioned effects of Federal Reserve action and subsequent commercial 
bank r eaction . 
Loss of liquidity 
The conventional asset management approach to banking theory (18) 
regards protec t ion of customer deposits as the primary r esponsibility of 
the c ommercia l bank . The bank must stand ready to honor the "demand" of 
a customer to dr aw from his account . These withdrawals f r om customer 
accounts may be expected or unexpected . The ability of the bank to meet 
expec t ed cash drains is most properly an indicator of its "liquidity" 
position . Its capacity to meet unfor seen drops i n deposits constitutes 
a measure of the bank's "soundness" (14, p . 2) . 
The bank provides for adequate liqu idity and soundness by maintaining 
a c ertain dollar amount of assets in the form of primary and secondary 
reserves . Primary reserves , made up of legal reserves (vault cash plus 
re serves at the Federal Reserve Bank) and working reserves (correspondent 
balances and other non- earning assets), satisfy the bank ' s legal reserve 
r equir ement a nd provide the necessary liquidity to mee t immediate deposit 
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drains. However , the bank will try to keep the level of primary reserves 
at a minimum since they earn no return and , thus, contribute nothing to 
profits. 
Secondary reserves - - short - term, highly liquid earning assets such 
as Tr easury bills -- are held to provide liquidity for expected needs 
such as seasonal demands and to maintain the bank ' s soundness to meet 
unforseen deposit drains due to business reversals or other adverse eco-
nomic situations . These secondary reserves, though held primarily for 
liquidity and soundness purposes, do contribute to the bank ' s profits . 
As the central bank sells securities to tighten up the money supply , 
prices on these securities will be driven down. Consequently, the real-
izable value of a bank's secondary reserves will drop . In an attempt to 
regain its desired dollar level of liquidity, the bank will be forced to 
purchase more secondary r eserve assets (13, p . 15) . As this is done, 
the asse t structure of the bank is shifted away from loans and other 
investments to the more liquid government securities . If loan demand 
remains the same, this decrease in loanable funds will necessitate 
rationing credit, by some method, among prospective borrowers . 
However, a more recent approach to maintaining adequate liquidity 
inc ludes liability management to complement asset adjus tment (17) . By 
offering higher rates on time deposits, borrowing Federal Funds , borrowing 
at the discount window, or increasing its liabilities in other ways, a 
bank can create a source of funds to meet liquidity needs without shifting 
the structure of its assets . To the extent that the bank can create 
liquidity in this manner , it will not have to sacrifice loans for more 
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liquid assets and, thus, will not be faced with the problem of credit 
rationing . 
Lock- in effect 
TI1c decline in security prices caused by central bank action will 
also affect the bank's propensity to hold government securities. If the 
bank tries to sell securities to meet loan demands as security prices 
decline , it may be forced to take capital losses on these assets . Since 
capital losses lower profits and subsequently may influence stockholder 
opinion about bank management, proponents of the " lock- in" effect contend 
that bank officers will be reluctant to liquidate their holdings of 
government securities (13 , p . 22). Thus , another force operates to 
restrict the size of the loan portfol io and to further necessitate credit 
rationing . 
However, the lock-in effect has fallen into disrepute in recent years 
as it has been recognized that capital losses on securities may be jus -
tified if the proceeds can be used to make a greater rate of return else -
where . 
Yet, there is another aspect of the influence of profits on bank 
behavior . As security prices decline, yields rise, both in an absolute 
sense and in relation to rates on loans. Consequently, the contribution 
made to profits by government securities will increase and cause bank 
managers to look more favorably on acquiring securities (13, p . 21) . 
Since securities introduce less r isk into the portfolio than loans, as 
yields rise , holdings of government securities may increase . Thus, 
acquisition of additional securities for pr ofit reasons will r einforce 
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any need to do so for liquidity purposes. 
Uncertainty 
Finally , monetary restraint may also affect the risk factor of a 
bank ' s assets by injecting added uncertainty into the government security 
and loan markets. As interest rates on securities change, Scott (22, p.42) 
notes that uncertainty with respect to the prices at which the securities 
can be sold before maturity increases . To relieve this added risk in the 
portfolio, he concludes that banks must move into governments (22, p . 45) . 
This follows from the fact that even though securities are more risky 
than before, they remain less risky than loans. To bring the asset port -
folio back to the desired level of risk, it is therefore necessary to 
substitute governments for loans. 
Rosa (19 , p . 287) extends the argument to the loan market by assert -
ing that a tightening of credit conditions, accompanied by higher interest 
rates , may make lenders expect even tighter conditions in the future . 
This will induce them to postpone part of their supply of credit to take 
advantage of higher r ates at a future date. 
Combined effects 
The liquidity , lock- in, and uncertainty effects of tight money 
combine to restrict the ability of the commercial bank to meet loan 
demands . Therefore , some mechanism for rationing credit , whether it be 
the interest rate or non- price criteria, is necessary. 
Credit Availability Models 
Although the above explanations offer some insight into the motivating 
forces causing credit r estraint, a more prec ise fo rmula tion of bank 
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behavior is necessary to explain the exact nnture of restricted avail -
ability during tight money . Following arc three proposed theoretical 
models which either lend support to or question the validity of non -
price credit rntioning. 
Hodgmnn model 
Oonnld Hodgman (9) offered one of the pioneering attempts to formally 
qunntify the credit availability tenets . His emphasis is centered about 
the prime r ate convent ion and the profitability of the customer relation-
ship . He formula tes the net revenue t hat the bank can r eceive from a 
customer as 
(2 - 1) P. 
1. 
1 
rd. ( 1 - R) + c .. L . . , 
1. 1.J 1.J 
where P. is the net earnings on the ith customer rela t ionship; r, the 
1. 
market rate of interest (adjusted for risk and net of costs) on loans and 
investments which do not involve a deposit relationship ; di , the deposit 
of the ith customer , net of loan proceeds; R, the ratio of the bank's 
cash and legal reserves to its demand deposits ; (1 - R), the proportion 
of deposits which can be used to acquire earning assets; L . . , a jth size 
1. J 
loan to the ith customer; and c .. , the preferential contrac t rate of 
1. J 
i nterest charged on the jth size loan to the ith customer . 
The net proceeds , P. , cons ist of the net revenue from earning assets 
1. 
supported by the customer' s deposit, r[d.(l - R)], plus the r evenue 
1. 
directly associated with the lonn to the customer , cijLij " 
1 
Hodgman also includes terms to provide for interest paid on demand 
deposits and for net service charges. Since exclusion of these does not 
alter the importan t relationships , they have been omitted . 
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These proceeds can be expressed as a percent of loan size and 
compared to the market rate of interest . If P./L .. = r, the return on 
l 1.J 
t he customer relationship is equal to that on loans to non- customers 
.:Jnd investments made at the market rate, r . When P./L .. is greater than 
1 1.J 
r , the bank enjoys a rate of return on its loan to the ith customer which 
exceeds the marke t r ate available on loans to non -depositors or on open 
market securities . 
The rate of r eturn on the customer relationship can be restated as 
(2 - 2) 
p 
i 
L·. 
1.J 
L . . 
1.J 
If this return is to be equal to that on an open mar ket opportunity, then 
(2 - 3) r = rdi(l - R) + c . . . 
1.J 
By rearranging terms, Hodgman arrives at the minimum rate which must be 
charged a customer with deposits of d. on a loan of size L .. : 
1 1.J 
(2 - 4) (min c . . ) 
1] = r[l -
d.(l - Rr J. 
As loan size , Li j ' increases toward infinity , the minimum preferential 
rate incr eases and approaches the market rate, r. Also , as deposit size , 
di ' approaches zero, the prefere ntial rate approaches the market rate. 
The relatio nship between the preferential rate and the loan to 
deposit ratio of the custome r is shown in Figure 1 by the cc ' line . The 
cc ' line approaches the rr' line at large loan sizes as indicated above . 
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% 
-------------- -----
c' 
1 
r 
M 
c 
r ' 
c ' 
L . . 
l. J 
cr:-
l. 
Figure 1 . Minimum preferential rate on a bank loan to a depositor 
A nega t ive pr eferential rate is possible if the earning assets supported 
by the customer ' s deposit ar e greater than t he size of the loan made: 
(2-5) di (1 - R) > L . .. 
l. J 
As the prime interest r ate convention is intr oduced , certain re -
strictions are imposed upon the bank . The prime rate is a tacitly agreed 
minimum interest rate , made among competing banks, on loans to deposit 
customers . It in effect r epresents that fixed rate charged on a loan to 
a bank ' s very best deposit customer . The prime rate establishes a floor 
on all preferential r ates and also dictates the largest individual loan/ 
deposit ratio that will be t oler ated by the bank at that rate . In 
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Figure 1, a prime rate of M will be charged on a loan to the very best 
customer up to a loan/deposit ratio of Lil/di . On any loan/deposit 
ratio below L. 1/d., the bank will make a rate of return greater than the l. l. 
market race (the difference represented by the vertical distance between 
the MM ' line and the cc' line) . A loan request at the prime rate which 
makes L .. /d. greater than L.
1
/d. will offer a net rate of return less 
l.J l. l. l. 
than that available in the market and will be refused, even at the expense 
2 
of losing the entire customer relationship (9, p. 118). 
The effec t of tight money on the system is to increase the market 
rate r, or the opportunity cost associated with making a loan to a 
depositor . As r is increased , (min c .. ) in Equation 2- 4 will be increased 
l.J 
for every loan size . The result in Figure 1 will be a shift in the cc ' 
line to c 1c 1
1
• If the prime rate does not change, the largest loa n/de -
posit ratio at the prime rate will decrease to L.
2
/d. f rom L. 1/d . . Thus, l. l. l. l. 
credit rationing results in the form of decreasing loan size . But , if 
the prime rate adjusts upward over time , as in usually the case , r ationing 
will become less severe and will take on temporary characteristics as 
claimed by Samuelson . 
In summary, the Hodgman model emphasizes the profitability of the 
customer relationship . By considering both the deposit size and loan 
request size of a customer , the bank can calculate a preferential rate 
to the customer which is commensurate with the rate available on market 
2 
The loan could be granted if the borrower were willing to provide 
a compensating deposit balance large enough to keep the loan/deposit 
ratio below the allowable maximum . See Hodgman (9, pp . 106 - 110). 
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inves tments or loans to non -depositors . 
If the prime r ate is introduced , this imposes a fixed rate on the 
sys tem which will set a limit on the size of the loan made at that rate . 
Any loan request made which is larger than the dicta ted maximum will be 
refused because the net return from the total customer relat ionship 
(deposits and loans) will be less than that available in the market . 
This r esults in credit rationing by loan size . 
However , the Hodgman model fails to deal adequately with the r i sk 
aspec t of bank portfolio management . Therefore, the Kane and Malkiel 
model will be introduced to bring this dimension into the theoretical 
discussion . 
Kane and Ma lkiel model 
Kane a nd Malkiel (11) use a modified Tobin-Markowitz portfolio model 
which considers a commercial bank to be a utility maximizer . The uti lity 
of the bank is dependent upon expected prof its and r i sk . It is assumed 
that bank managers choose between but two types of assets l oans (L) 
and government securities (G) . 
The fo llowi ng equations describe the model: 
(2 - 6) 
(2-7) 
max U = U[E (n ), a 2 (n) J ; 
L + G = D + N where L ~ 0 and G ~ 0; 
Expected profi ts and risk are represented by E(n) and cr2 (n) respectively; 
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D and N s tand [or deposi ts an<l ne t worth which are assumed known and 
3 
consta nt . 
(2-8) E(-.) L · E(r) + G · E(g) 
where E(r) represents the expected holding-period rates of return on 
loans, and E(g) the expec t ed rates on governments . 
(2 - 9) 
2 
cr (n ) 
2 2 
L cr + 2LG6 cr cr r rg r g 
2 2 
+ G cr • g 
The bank ' s utility surface is restricted by 
(2 - 10) o~~n) > o' ~u < o 
acr (n ) 
such that utility is increased by higher expected profits and decreas ed 
by additional risk . The marginal rate of substitution along a utility 
indifference curve is positive since additional risk must be compensated 
by larger expected profits to keep utility constant . 
Kane and Malkiel graphically illustrate the mode l as shown in 
Figur e 2 . 2 The arguments of the utility function, E(n ) and cr (n ), are 
used as axe s, and the loan portfolio is allowed to consist of all com-
binations of loans and government securities f rom 100% governments and 
0% loans to 100% loans and 0% governments . It is assumed that risk 
2 2 associated with governments is l ess than that on loans (cr < cr ) and that 
g r 
the rate of return on loans exceeds that on governments , E(r) > E(g) . 
3
variable deposits are introduced into the model in a later section 
of the article . 
100% Gov ' ts 
0% Loans 
Figure 2 . Portfolio allocation 
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B A 100% Loans 
0% Gov ' ts 
E(n) 
The o
1 
line in Figure 2 represents the particular risk-profit com-
bination of any specifi c loan- governmen t portfol i o mix . The overall risk 
of the portfolio wil l decline as loans are first included because of the 
effect of diversity . As more loans are incorporated in relation to 
governments, however , the force of (cr
2 > cr 2) will take over and cause the 
r g 
overall risk to rise . The risk related to holding 100% loans is greater 
than that of holding 100% governments since a2 > cr2 
r g 
Expected profits 
increase as more loan s are included in the por tfolio since E( r) > E(g) . 
The u1 line in Figure 2 , represen t ing the bank ' s indifference curve, 
is concave downward due to t he positive marginal rate of substitution 
between r i sk and profit . The specific loan- government combination which 
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maximizes lhe bank ' s utiliLy will be at A which corresponds to that point 
where the indi[ference curve u1 is tangent to the opportunity - locus o1 . 
The imposition of central bank action on the system will introduce 
increased uncertainty in the government securities market and cause the 
o
1 
line to shift upward to o
2
. If the bank readjusts its assets to once 
again attain optimality, it will move out of loans into governments 
(A to B). If loan demand remains constant, then it seems that r ationing 
must take place . However , Kane and Malkiel argue that noth ing in the 
model would lead one to expect credit rationing (11, p . 118) . Rather, 
they contend that bankers will rely on the interest rate mechanism to do 
the job . However, it should be noted that rationing on the basis of loan 
quality is implicitly impossible in the model sinc e Kane and Malkiel 
initially assume a homogeneous class of loan applicants. 
They further supper t their non- rationing argument by introducing L~" 
borrowers, who, because of their continuing contribution to bank utility, 
will be satisfied at any cost . Holdings of government securities will be 
sacrificed, even at a utility loss, to accommodate these favored customers . 
The only support they lend the credit rationing argument is via thr ee 
intuitive suggestions : (1) that rais ing credit standards may in effect 
be an implicit increase in interest r ates ; (2) that legal ceilings or 
other institutional r estraints may make interest rates sticky; or (3) 
that as a customer borrows more and more money , his financial position 
becomes weaker and weaker until a point is reached where t he bank may 
4 
refuse him anothe r loan . 
4 
Hodgman (10) and Freimer and Gordon (5) develop this suggestion of 
credit r ationing in much more detail . 
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In their concluding r emarks, Kane and Malkiel do modify their 
ins iste nce on no cred it rationing by recognizing differing degrees of 
>'< 
L - ness among borrowers . They expec t that to the ex t ent credit racioning 
does exist , it will be done on the basis of existing customer relation-
ships; the size , stability , and prospects fo r future growth of deposits; 
and the ex istence of profitable future lending opportunit ies (11, p . 129) . 
In summary , the Kane and Malkiel model describes bank behavior as 
the adjustment of assets (loans and gover nments) to maximize util i ty . 
Since profits and risk constitute the arguments of the bank's utility 
function , the introduction of additional risk into the portfolio via 
tigh t money causes the bank to readjust its assets in f avor of gove r nments . 
However, the loan market disequilibrium caused by this decrease in loan -
able funds will be adjusted by the interest rate mechanism, not by credit 
rationing , accordi ng to Kane and Malkiel. Credit r ationing is f ur ther 
disputed by the existence of L'" (favored) borrowers who wil l be accom-
modated at any cost since t heir continued relationship with the bank is 
impor tant to bank utility. 
However, t:he model is hampered by the lack of emphasis on differing 
degrees of deposit contribution and creditworthiness among borrowers . 
To bring these areas into focus, a model includ i ng an explicit deposit 
r elationship will be presented and Luckett ' s model incorporating the 
discrepancies in loan quality will be reviewed. 
Kane and Malkiel model - a mod ification 
Deposit customers will affect bank utility, not only t hrough their 
loan demands , but also through the size and stability of their de posi t 
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accollnts . Fot' this r eason, I propose a simple modification of the: Kane 
and Malkiel framework to explicitly inclllde the deposit relationship in 
profit and risk determination . 
The deposit relationship can be introdllced into the utility frame -
work by altering the set of equations as follows : 
(2 - 11) 
(2 - 12) 
(2 - 13) 
max U = U[E(n), a2 (~)] ; 
E(n) = f [E (r), E(g), D] ; and 
2 2 2 2 
a (n) = h (cr, a , crD) . 
r g 
Utility still remains a function of profits and risk , bu t now profits 
depend on expected loan r ates, expected government r ates , and on the 
level of deposits . Risk becomes a function of loan rate variab i lity, 
government r ate variability, and deposit variability. If a bank is faced 
with excess loan demand , decisions as to the method of al location will be 
affected by the strength of the customer relati onship which is dete r mined 
by the size and stabi l ity of a customer's deposit account . 
It can be assumed that a bank will have four gener al types of deposit 
customers -- those who main t ain (1) large, stable deposits; (2) small, 
stable deposits ; (3) l arge , unstable deposits; or (4) small , unstable 
deposits. Customers with l a r ge , stable deposits wil l be preferred over 
all o t hers; those wi t h small, unstable deposits will lend the least to 
bank utility . It will be fur t her assumed that loans a r e normally dis -
tributed among these classes of depositors as shown in Figure 3 . 
Given a certai n amount of funds available for lend ing , if customer 
demands exceed this , t he bank has two alternatives -- (1) weaken its 
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l·quidity position to s.:itisfy all customers , or (2) refuse some loan 
·,'r 
requests . Kane and Malkiel seem to imply that L customers will be 
satisfied at the expense of liquidity . But it now becomes clear that 
favored customers can be accommodated at the expense of poorer customers . 
If the bank is determined to maintain its liquidity position at the 
desired level, then it can cut some borrowers out of the mar ket . The 
question remains -- how? 
No. of Loan 
Customers 
High D 
2 
Low crD 
Low D 
2 
Low crD 
High D 
High cr~ 
Low D 
. h 2 Hig crD 
Type of 
Deposit 
Figure 3 . Di stribu tion of loan customers as to size and stability of 
deposit account 
If the bank leaves the job of al location to the interest rate 
mechanism , then it is, in effect, granting credit to anyone who will pay 
the price , regardless of the strength of his customer relationship. If 
retention of a customer ' s deposit account is dependent upon loan accom-
modation, since the bank has no control over the number of borrowers in 
each of the deposit classes who are eliminated by the interest rate 
charged, the bank may lose some of its best deposit customers. On the 
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other hand, if the bank does its own rationing, it can accommodate those 
customers who offer the bank the most utility . 
To state this in terms of the model , the changes in utility brought 
about by bank controlled variables will be 
(2 - 14) dU oU cE (n) , 
dE (r) oE (n ) oE (r) 
(2 - 15) dU = oU oE ~r ~ , and dD oE(n) oD 
(2 - 16/ dU ('U ocr
2 ~n2 
d 2 2 2 
crD ocr ( n ) ocrD 
The inclusion of the customer relationship in the utility framework gives 
the bank additional control over its own utility. Now, by selecting its 
2 
customers, it can alter D and crD to directly affect its optimum position . 
A bank will rely on the interest rate to ration credit only if 
(2-17) 
wher e the subscript r indicates rationing by interest rate and R, r ation-
ing by deposit criteria. As indicated above , if the interest rate is used , 
2 
(dU/dD)r + (dU/d crD)r may be negative due to the loss of customers with 
large, stable accounts . This in turn will reduce the contribution to 
utility made by the higher interest rate. At the extr eme, it might be 
possible that as loa n rates move high enough to clear the market, only 
poor depositor - borrowers will be wil l ing to pay the price . This will 
skew the distribution of loans to the right in Figure 3 and will leave 
the bank with overall deposits which are considerably smaller and less 
stable . 
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It becomes possible then chat more utility can be gained (or less 
utility lose) by directly rationing credit than by allowing the interest 
rate mechanism to allocate loans . Hence, the deposit-relationship 
influence of loan customers may contribute motivation, consistent with 
bank utility maximization, fo r non- price credit rationing. 
Luckett model 
Another characteristic of the customer rela tionship -- the credit -
worthiness of the borrower -- is demonstrated to effectuate non - price 
credit rationing in a model developed by Luckett (14). He argues that 
r aising credit standards on loans during tight money will allow the bank 
to expand loans to meet demand without increasing the aggregate risk 
exposure of the asset portfolio . Specifically, the additional risk 
introduced into the portfolio by selling governments to expand loans can 
be offset by upgrading the quality of loans made . Thus , profits can be 
increased by moving from governments to loans while r isk can be main-
tained at the previously accepted level. 
The commercial bank is consider ed to be a util i ty maximizer , as in 
the Ka ne a nd Malkiel model , but profit and soundness c onstitute the 
5 
arguments of the utility function . The model is specified by the 
5 
Liquidity is also considered, in an earlier draft of the paper , to 
be a variable affecting uti lity , but since it does not alter the conclu -
sions of the model a nd does complicate the algebra , it is omitted . 
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following equations and functional properties: 
(2 - 18) 
(2 - 19) 
R + G + L = D, and 
u U(n , 'T ); oU 
on 
oU > 0 a,-
where R is required reserves , G is government securities, L is loans and 
D is demand deposits . Deposits are assumed given and required reserves 
bear the usual fixed relation to deposits . Profits and soundness are 
represented by TI and T respectively. A ceteris paribus incr ease in 
profits or soundness will add to bank utility . 
Luckett alleviates the problem of the homogeneous loan portfolio in 
the Kane and Malkiel model by dividing bank loans into two classes , 
6 
st r ong (Ls) and weak (1w) . These are combined with the other assets and 
liabilities of the bank to determine a measure of the bank's soundness. 
It is assumed that the banker attaches subjective weights to each of his 
assets according to his best estimate of their realizable value in case 
of forc ed liquidation under distress conditions . The degree of the bank 's 
soundness is measured by the excess of its weighted assets over its 
weighted liabilities (14 , p . 4) . Therefor e, 
(2-20) T cR + aG + b L + b L - cD s s w w 
where c , a, bs , and bw are the assigned weights and a> bs > bw . 
611While the quality of the l oans of an actual bank no doubt comprise 
a continuous spectrum from poor to excellent, it wil l be adequate to 
separ ate loans into two classes . " (14, p. 5) . 
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The profit function is written as 
(2 - 21) TI rG + y L + y L s s w w 
where r is the r.:ite of return on governments, Y the net (of lending w 
costs) rate charged on weak loans, and Y the net ra te on strong loans . 
s 
It is assumed that Yw' Y
5 
> r. 
The bank is considered to be a constrained maximizer, maximizing 
profits subject to the soundness constraint . Using the technique of 
Lagrangian multipliers , Luckett derives the values for the bank controlled 
variables (L , L , y , y ) which will provide the constrained maximum . 
w s w s 
Next he allows b to become a decision variable which can also be altered 
w 
in r esponse to changing economic conditions . 
When the mode l is subjected to tight money , the optimal values for 
T. , L , y , and y increase . This yields the familiar results of 
\V s w s 
inc r easing loan to deposit r atios and r ising loan r ates during periods of 
monetary restraint . More importantly, tight money also causes t he value 
for b to rise . Since b is the weight attached to weak loans in the w w 
soundness calculation and indicates the r ealizable value of the L loans , 
w 
an increase in b can be interpreted as evidence of a r ise in the bank ' s w 
standards of creditworthiness. Thus, bank response to tight money will 
include non- price rationing of credit. 
Summary 
The liter atur e offers theoretical models of bank behavior which both 
justify and dispute non - price credit rationing . The validity of the credit 
availability doctrine must therefore rest on empirical evidence . 
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Unfortunately , such evidence is scarce . The only major study, other than 
the AHA surveys , dealing with credit availability is one conducted by 
Donald Hester in conjunction with his development and testing of a bank 
loan offer function (8). 
Hester Study 
Hester develops a theory to explain the terms at which a bank wi t h 
particular characteristics will lend to a loan applicant . The theory 
relates , through a bank loan offer function, the ter ms at which a specific 
bank will be wil l ing to lend to a borrowe r wi th known profits, balance 
sheet characteristics , and credit history . Four principal terms of 
lending ar e considered : (1) the loan rate , (2) the loan maturity, (3) 
the size of the loan , a nd (4) the likelihood of secur i ty. It i s hypoth -
esized that banks a r e willing to substitute among t hese terms of lending 
such that , fo r example , l onger maturity loans might be ob ta ined by paying 
higher rates of interest a nd/or accepting a smaller sized loan and/or 
by offeri ng more security . 
Data, concerning the years 1955 and 1957, from three large conunercial 
banks and f r om surveys conducted by the Federal Rese rve are used to test 
various hypotheses related to the loan offer function . Hester r epor t s 
that it appears that banks do trade off terms of l ending (8 , p . 52) . 
The r e levance of the loan offer function to the availability doctrine 
lies in the bank ' s use of these lending terms for r ation ing cr iteria . 
Hester finds that there is some evidence that banks are less willing to 
grant long maturity t er m loans as interest rates r ise . However, analysis 
of commercial a nd industrial loans reveals that borrowers of any particular 
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size could obta i n loans of at least t he same matur ity , the same amount, 
.:ind \vith th0 same l ik.:! l ihoo<l of sccur ily r egardless of the l~vel of 
competing interest r ates . He concludes that in the situation r epresented 
by his data , "ther e was no credit ra tioning" (8 , p . 54 ) . 
Thus, the Hes ter study disagrees with the results of the ABA surveys 
and creates an even greater need for more evidence to resolve the credit 
rationing controversy . The remainder of the thesis is devoted to providing 
an empirical analysis of bank response to tight money . 
Description of the Study 
The procedure used to tes t the credit a vailability doctrine was a 
two - period comparative analysis contrasting the characteristics of 
borrowers and loans at a single bank during a tight money period and an 
easier money period . The test bank is a medium-sized Iowa bank with 
assets and deposits between $10 - 25 million . The tight money period , 
selected on the basis of general monetary conditions and interviews with 
the bank's officers, was August, 1966 . The easier money period, c hosen 
for contrast , was August of 1964 . The same month was selected in both 
periods to avoid seasonal differences in variables affecting loan supply 
and demand . 
Information on national monetary conditions and on t he bank's pos i t ion 
was compi l ed for the months preceeding the two periods and is prese nted in 
Chapter III. 7 Data were col l ected on all cash loans, $500 and above, made 
7 
Commercial and personal loans other than real estate and consumer 
installment loan s . 
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during the two test months . Averages reflecting characteristics of the 
loans and the borrowers were calculated and contrasted to test various 
hypotheses about the credit availability tenets . The results of this 
analysis are presented in Chapter IV . Finally, conclusions about the 
effect of tight money on this specific bank are drawn in Chapter V. 
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CHAPTER III . MONETARY CONDITIONS: 1964 AND 1966 
General Trends 
General monetary conditions in t he United States during 1964 and 
1966 set the stage for the two - period comparative analysis . During 
1964 , Federal Reserve authorities sought to "contribute to orderly and 
sustainable expansion in the domestic economy" (24, p . 9) . The Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York (3 , p. 23) described monetary policy as one 
which " facilitated a high r ate of growth in bank credit and the money 
supply ." 
In contrast, 1966 was described as a year of monetary restraint. 
The major task of monetary policy was to " restrain demand pressur es in 
an economy that was clearly overheated" (4, p . 21) . The Federal Reserve 
" endeavor ed to slow the rate of monetary expansion , first by raising the 
discount rate in December , 1965, and then beginning in Februar y, by 
reduc ing the rate at which it supplied reserves to commercial banks 
through operations of the System Open Market Account" (25, p . 3) . 
Familar policy indicators also stress the relative monetary tight -
ness of 1966 compared to 1964. Interest rates on 3 - 5 year gove r nment 
bonds increased from 3 . 81% to 3 . 99% f r om August, 1963 to August, 1964 , 
while they increased from 4 . 19% to 5 . 58% from August , 1965 to August, 
1966. ~Bank rates on short- term loans hovered near 5 . 00% from August , 
1963 to August, 1964 but increased from 5 . 00% to 5 . 82% over the same 
months during 1965 - 66 (26) . Free reserves declined much more r apidly 
and to much lower levels in 1966 than in 1964 . Figure 4 shows the 
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movement of free reserves at all member banks from January to August of 
the two Lest years . 
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Figure 4 . Free reserves : 1964 and 1966 (26) 
The effect of t he contrasting monetary policies on commercial bank 
portfolio allocation during the months leading up to the two test periods 
can be discerned by comparing the values of analytical bank ratios for 
1964 and 1966 . The loan - to-deposit ratio, for example , is one of the 
more conunonly used indicators of bank liquidity . An increase in a bank's 
loan/deposit ratio denotes that the bank is allocating more of its 
resources (deposits) t o the less liquid loan portfolio . Increasing 
loan/deposit r atios ar e typical during tight money periods when banks 
move into more loans to try to satisfy higher loan demands. 
28 
Figure 5 shows the average loan/deposit ratios for all member banks 
for the 12 months preceding the test months . The August 1963 rat io was 
used as a base and all subsequent ratios were indexed as a percent of 
that figure . The 1965- 66 monthly rat ios remained about 10% higher than 
those for the month s preceding August, 1964 . 
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Figure 5 . Loan/deposit r atios : al l member banks (26) 
Capital adequacy is another bank characteristic which play s a dom -
inant role in managemen t of funds . It guarantees the continued ability 
of the bank to serve the needs of the community and to maintain public 
confidence in the bank ' s management . One indicator commonly used to 
denote the degree of capital adequacy is the capital/risk asset ratio . 
Since capital prov ides the base for cont i nuing operations, even in 
periods of stress conditions, and since risk as sets8 constitute the 
8 
Risk assets inc lude all assets except cash and gove r nment securities. 
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possible sources of losses during Lhese stress periods, the capital/risk 
ass~t ratio represents a measure of possible capital impairment . As the 
ratio falls in value (risk assets increase faster than the capital base) , 
the ability of the bank to ultimately absorb losses on these risk assets 
diminishes. One would expec t that during tight money periods bank 
capital/risk asset ratios decline since increased loan demand, ceteris 
paribus , will cause a shift into loans away from government securities 
and thus , increase the total volume of risk assets . Figure 6 relates 
the levels and movements of average capital/risk asset ratios during the 
months before August, 1964 and August , 1966 . Tighter money c onditions 
in 1965- 66 are evidenced by the lower ratio values . 
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Figure 6. Capital/r isk asset ratios: all member banks (26) 
Thus, 1966 and 1964 seem to offer an appropriate contrast for 
studying the effec t s of tight money on bank management. S~ated policy, 
policy indicators , and aggregate analytical ratios all indicate t hat 
JO 
borrowers faced more competition for bank loans during 1966 than in 1964 . 
Position of the Test Bank 
In addition to observing the general monetary conditions leading 
up to the test months , it is important to describe and evaluate the 
position and condition of the test bank to determine if it also was 
faced with contrasting monetary situations appropriate for determining 
bank response to tight money. 
Figure 7 shows the loan/deposit ratios of the test bank. Once 
again, the August 1963 value was used as a base. Although more erratic 
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Figure 7. Loan/deposit ratios : test bank 
than the averages of all member banks , the ratios do take on higher values 
during most of the 1965 - 66 period . This i nd i cates that general pressures 
on lending resources experienced by the nation as a whole were also felt 
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by this particular bank . Tighter conditions in 1966 are especi al ly 
evident during the months i.nunedia tc ly pr eceding the test months. From 
December to August, 1965-66, loan/deposit ratios increased by 17 . 5% 
while during the same period i n 1963- 64 they decreased by 15 . 4'7~ . Also , 
during this period , 1966 ratio values were approximately 20% higher than 
those for 1964 . Thus, the bank experienced a greater percentage increase 
in i ts loan/deposit r atio f r om 1964 to 1966 than the national ave r age . 
Figure 8 depicts the comparative capital/r isk asset r atios . These 
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Figure 8 . Capital/risk asset rat ios : test bank 
do not indicate as explicit a n argument for tigh t money pressures as the 
loan/deposit ratio. However , capital/risk asset ratio values are less 
over most of the period from December to August of 1966 than during the 
same interval of 1964. Also, the 1965- 66 r atio decreased by 10 .4% from 
December to August while the 1963 - 64 ratio increased by 3 . 1%. 
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The two analy tical ratios taken together indicate that th0 test 
b:rnk Jid experience tighter conditions during 1965 - 66 than' in 1963 - 64 . 
It shuul<l be noted , however , that the two a nalytical ratio comparisons 
demonstrate th:.-it monetary r estraint pressed down on the test bank lacer 
th.:in it <lid on banks in general. Loan/deposit ratios we1·e higher and 
cap ital/risk asset ratios lower for banks in general over the entire 
12 month per iod befor e August of 1966 . On the other hand, January of 
1966 seemed to initiate the tight money movement for the test bank . 
A final measurement which will aid in establishing the position of 
the bank is Luckett 's soundness coefficient . Appropriate weights for 
the realizable value of assets and liabilities held by the bank can be 
obtained from the "For m for Analyz i ng Bank Capital11 9 used by Feder al 
Reserve examiners . This form designates t he percentage capital require-
ment on each type of asset and liability that the bank holds . If the 
bank needs to hold a certain amount of capital for eac h asset and 
liability, then one minus the percentage capital r equirement will give 
a percentage indication of the expected immediate r ealizable value. 
Since the breakdown of assets and liabilities on the form is much mor e 
sophisticated than the categories of data available for the bank, 
specific weights were averaged t o obtain approximate weights for the 
more general classifications . 
9 
This form is r epr oduced by Lyon (15 , Appendix 2) . 
33 
The following formula for soundness resulted : 
(3 - 1) T 0.33 (Reserves required for demand deposits) 
+ 0 . 20 (Reserves required for time deposits) 
+ 0 . 90 (U.S . government securities) 
+ 1.00 (Federal funds) 
+ 0 . 75 (State .'.lnd local securities) 
,... 0 . 75 (Loans + commercial paper) 
- 0 . 33 (Demand deposits) 
- 0 . 20 (Time deposits) . 
It is assumed that excess reserves equal zero . 
A change in the soundness coefficient could r esult from a shifting 
of types of assets within the asset base or from a change in the asset 
base itself . Ther efore, to provide a measure which could be meaningfully 
compared from one time period to another, the soundness coefficient was 
divided by the asset level to obtain the soundness/asset ratio. This 
ratio gives a comparative measure of the ability of t he commercial bank 
to meet an unexpected and substantial decrease in deposits . 
In periods of t ight money, it would be expected that, ceter is 
paribus , the soundness/asset ratio wil l be lower than in easier money 
periods . As a bank ad justs its assets in response to increased loan 
demand , the soundness coefficient will diminish and thus , the ratio will 
decline . 
Figure 9 shows t he soundness/asset ratios for the considered time 
intervals. It is no t at all apparent that relative soundness for the 
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two intervals was substantially different although , or.ce again, some 
tightness is in evidence during the months irrunediately befor e the August 
test periods . The soundness/asset ratio was lower for most of the 
December - August pe r iod in 1965 - 66 a nd decreased by 3 . 4% as c ompared to 
an increase of 0 . 6% fo r the same per iod i n 1963- 64 . 
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Figure 9 . Soundness/asset ratios : test bank 
~a t e that , a lthough the loan/deposit ratio increased sharply fro~ 
1964 t o 1966 , the soundness/asset r atio remained a t r e latively the same 
level . This i s due in part to the fact that the drop in soundness caused 
by the shift i nto loans was offset by an i ncrease in soundne ss due to an 
increase in time deposits at the bank. 
In conclusion , it is clea r that the t est bnnk experienced an 
increased dema nd for loans , relative to its re sources, during the six 
mo nths leading up to August , 1966 . However , the bank ' s l evels of 
capital adequacy and soundness seemed to be maintained dur ing this tight 
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money episode which indicates that the bank probably did not face the 
degree of tightness experienced by banks in general . Nevertheless, 
the conditions of August, 1964 and August , 1966 offer enough of a 
contrast to provide for a meaningful analysis of the differences of 
loan policy during easy and tight money . The next chapter presents the 
analysis of loan and borr ower characteristics and the testing of the 
credit availability hypotheses. 
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CHAPTER IV . CREDIT AVAILABILITY ANALYSIS 
Stotement of Hypotheses 
On the basis of the theories described in Chapter II, four major 
credit availability hypotheses describing the action of a bank were 
formulated . During tight money , the bank will , in addition to raising 
interest rates, ration credit in the following ways: 
(1) raise standards of c r editworthiness; and/or 
(2) satisfy established deposit - customer requests before those of 
new customers or non - customers ; and/or 
(3) gr ant smaller loans than requested; and/or 
(4) shorten loan maturities . 
These hypotheses wer e subjected to bank officer evalua tion and statistical 
analysis for verification . 
Bank Officer Evaluation 
Officers at the test bank indicated that r a t ioning along non- pr ice 
lines does occur dur ing tight money . In periods of excess loan demand, 
satisfaction of established customers attains a prime position in loan 
considerations . Credit positions of bor rowers are r eviewed carefully 
and those customers offering the bank the greatest degree of credit -
worthiness are favo r ed . Loan size, typically, is scaled back on 
marginal loan requests as the quantity of credit demanded exceeds the 
available loanable funds . Finally, shorter maturities become a natural 
by - pr oduct of rising interest rates as the bank becomes increasingly 
aware that even better opportunities may develop in the near future . 
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SLatistical Analysis 
To mak0 Lhc strongest tust of the hypotheses, daLa concern i ng loan 
refusals a na loan term rejections would be ncc~ssary . Since such infor -
mation was not available, each of the hypolhcses was tcst~d by contrasting 
loan characteristics for August, 1964 and August, 1966 . A basic assump-
tion of the study is that the borrowers in both test months came from 
the same population and made similar loan r equests for similar purposes . 
The analysis was first made with data from all loans . Business loans 
we r e then singled out for separate investigation . The loans considered 
in each of the two months constituted the entire population of cash loans 
$500 and above . Comparisons made were between population averages from 
population sizes of 103 in 1966 and 70 in 1964 . Population sizes for 
business loans were 54 and 32 for 1966 and 1964 respectively . 
Higher interest rates 
The test bank conformed to the general trend of higher interest rates 
in the August, 1966 , period as compared to August, 1964 . The average 
inter est rate for loans made in each test month was calculated . Ave rage 
interest r ates weighted by loan size and weighted by credit ratings were 
10 also computed . The use of credit ratings as a weight assigns a measure 
of loan quality to the price charged for borrowing and attaches incr eased 
significance to loans made to respectively better credit customers . 
10 
The credit ratings of loan customers were obtained from the l ocal 
credit burea u and categorized into five groups according to quality . 
These categories were in turn assigned a value from 0 co 4 with 0 repre -
senting the poorest cred it group and 4 the best . The customer's credit 
rating weight was t hen used to compute the weighted average . 
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T.::ibll' 1 contr.::ists tile .::ivcruges and weighted averages for interes t 
rates charged on all loans and business l oans only . The averages for 
both classifications increased by appr oximately 7 to 8 percent from 
1964 to 1966 . 
Table 1 . Interest rates at the test bank 
All Loans Busi ness Loans 
Test Statistic 1966 1964 1966 1964 
Ave. Interest Rate 6 . 65% 6 . 18% 6.72% 6 . 27% 
Wt . Ave . Int . Rate 
(by loan size) 6 . 67 6 . 14 6 . 69 6 . 24 
Wt . Ave . Int. Rate 
(by credit rating) 6 .4 7 5 . 98 6.51 6 . 05 
Higher credit standards 
Many test statistics were available to examine t he level of credit 
standards in the two time periods. Credit ratings , the financial posi -
t ions of the borrowers, a nd collateral requirements made by the bank all 
contributed to the analysis . Table 2 relates t he comparative figures 
for these data. 
The average credit rating of loan customer s was computed on the 
basis of the assigned weights described in foo tnote 10 (p . 37) . The 
hypothesized imposition of higher credit standards during tight money 
implies a higher average credit rating . The table shows that the average 
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credit r..itings rose for both t:he all lo•rns and business loans cL:issifi -
cations from 1964 to 1966 . These statistics , however, are bias~d by the 
Table 2 . Credit standards al the test bank 
All Loans Business Loans 
Test Statistic 1966 1964 1966 1964 
.\v~ . Credit Ra t ing 3 . 45 3 . 25 J . 28 2 . 93 
Wt . AV!!. . Cr~dit Rating 
(by loan size) 3 . 57 3 . 55 3 . 55 3 . £.4 
Ave . Current Ra tio 4 . 66 3 . 15 4 . 87 3 . 53 
Wt . Ave . Current Ratio 
(by loan size) 4 . 49 3 . 18 4 . 65 3 . 56 
Ave . (Loan/Ne t Wor th) 0 .06 0 . 11 0 . 06 0 . 08 
Ave . (Total Loans/Net Worth) 0 . 14 0 . 17 0 . 17 0 . 12 
(Secured $)/(Total $ Loaned) 0 .50 0 . 62 0 .42 0 .44 
(# Secured Loans)/(Total # Loans) 0 . 49 0 . 57 0 .46 0 .44 
fact that cr edit ratings were not available for every borrower. Decisions , 
never theless, were made by the bank, even without t his credit information . 
Consequently, the " no rating" (NR) gr oup became an alternative lending 
category in loan decisions . 
Table 3 br eaks down the all loans classification into cred~t rating 
gr oups (including NR loans) . The column relating t he percent of the 
total number of loans made t o each group indicates that the bank moved 
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away from poorer credit borrowers and NR borrowers in 1966 . This would 
imply that the bank was taking fewer chances on poor credit loans and on 
Table 3 . Breakdown of loans by credit rating 
% of No . Loaned % of Dollars Loaned 
Credit Rating 1966 1964 1966 1964 
4 49 . 5 42 . 9 50 . 2 61.1 
3 20 . 4 14 . 2 22 . 7 17 . 2 
2 3 . 9 12 . 9 2 . 2 9 .0 
1 1.0 5 . 7 0 . 6 1. 7 
0 2 . 9 0 . 0 1. 3 0 . 0 
NR 22.3 24.3 23 .4 11 . 1 
loans characterized by a lack of credit information . The column specify-
ing the percentage of total dollars loaned, however , tells a conflicting 
story . In this case , a higher percentage of NR dollars and a lower 
percentage of high quality dollars were in evidence in 1966 than in 1964 . 
The average financial characteristics of borrowers should improve 
when standards of creditworthiness are raised . Since the current ratio 
is an indicator of a borrower ' s ability to meet his short- term obliga -
tions , the bank would , during periods of excess loan demand , accommodate 
those borrower s with the highest current ratios. Similarly , the bank 
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imposing higher credit standards would tend to grant loans to those 
customers offering the most net worth in proportion to loan size and in 
proportion to the borrower' s tocal amount of loans outstanding at the 
bank . Thus, accord ing to the hypothesis , higher average current ratios 
and lower average loan/net worth ratios would be i n evidence during tight 
money . 
Table 2 shows that the average current rat ios of borrowers were 
substantiall y highe r (30 to 40%) in August of 1966 than in August of 1964 . 
The average level of net worth supporting a dollar loaned or a dollar of 
total loans outstanding also increased for the all loans c l assification , 
although movements of these same averages fo r business loans were in 
c onflict . 
Finally, during periods of tight money, according to the hypothesis , 
the bank would require more loans to be s ecured and would demand more 
security per dollar loaned . The collateral r equi r ements on loans during 
the two months were contrasted by examining the numbe r of secured loans 
as a percent of the total number of loans and the dollar amount of 
secured loans as a percent of total dollars loaned . These ratios would 
be expected to increase as t he bank faced tighter credit conditions . 
Table 2 indicates that these aver ages declined from 1964 to 1966 
for all loans . The percent of secured dol l a rs decreased, while the 
per cent of total loans made increased for the business loan category. 
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Established-cuscomer accommodation 
The scrength of a customer ' s relationship with a bank can be measured 
by the length of that relationship and by the characteristics of his 
deposit account . If a bank rations credi t by favoring certain customers, 
then it would select those customers with the largest, most stable deposit 
accounts and the longest continued customer relationships . Unfortuna tely, 
data regarding deposit variability were not available . Table 4 relates 
averages used to describe the strength of the customer relationship . 
Table 4 . Loan- customer characteristics at the test bank 
All Loans Business Loans 
Test Statis tic 1966 1964 1966 1964 
Ave . (Loan/Min . Bal . ) 65 . 15 87 .18 93 . 35 128.09 
Ave . Length of Customer 
Relationship 3 . 14 3 .01 3 . 29 3 .47 
Wt . Ave . Length of 
Customer Rela tionship 
(by loan size) 3 . 15 3 . 21 3 . 29 3 . 62 
The size of a customer' s deposit account was measured by calculating 
the average minimum balance for six months prior to the loan . This 
minimum balance was r ela t ed to the loan size to compute the average 
(loan/minimum balance) figu r e shown in Table 4 . In pe r iods of tight 
money, according to the hypothesis, this average should decrease as the 
bank makes loans to cu stomers with higher minimum balances . Fr om 
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August, 1964 , to August, 1966, the average decreased for both all loans 
and business loans by 25 . 3% and 27 . 1% respectively . The decrease in this 
average could be attributed to either a lower loan size or a higher 
minimum balance . Since average loan size decreased by less than the 
25 . 3% and 27 . 1% figures (see the next section) , evidently the average 
minimum balance support ing a one dol l ar loan in 1966 was greater than 
that for 1964 . 
Customers were classified i nto five groups for purposes of estab -
lishing the length of the customer relationship . These g roups were then 
assigned values as follows: l ess than 1 year - - O; 1- 5 years -- l; 
6- 10 year s -- 2; 11- 15 years 3 ; and over 15 years - - 4 . Successively 
gr eater weights we r e associated with respectively longer customer re la tion-
ships . The customers were so grouped because it is hardly expected that 
a bank would refuse a loan to an 8 - year customer while granting an 
identical loan to an identical customer with a 9 -year customer relation -
ship . Rather, it is more probable that bank officers categorize 
borrowers, in some manner , according to the length of the customer 
relationship . 
If a bank rations credit to those customers with the longest rela -
tionships , the value of the ave r age weights should increase during 
periods of excess loan demand . At this bank, as shown in Table 4, the 
average length of the customer r elationship was greater i n only the all 
loans category during the tight money period examined . The all loans 
weighted aver age and the averages i n the business loans category all 
were smaller in August, 1966, than in August , 1964 . 
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Smalle r loans 
This hypothesis contends chat borrowers will be granted smaller 
loans during t ighc money cha n during periods of less restra i nt. Such 
action allows the bank to satisfy mor e loan customers with the same 
dollar amount of lending resources . 
Table 5 give s the average loan size figur es for August, 1964, and 
A~gust, 1966. The average loan size and t he average loan size weighted 
by credit r a ting dec r eased for both loan classifications in 1966 . The 
average and weighted average fo r all loans decreased by 16 . 2% and 33 . 3% 
r espectively while the same averages for business loans decreased by 
only 3 . 3% and 14 . 7%. 
Table 5 . Loan sizes at the test bank 
All Loans Business Loans 
Test Statistic 1966 1964 1966 1964 
Ave . Loan Size $2 , 637 $3,145 $3 , 563 $3,683 
Wt . Ave . Loan Size 
(by credit rating) 2,693 4,038 3,947 4,630 
Although the average figu res r elate that this bank gr anted smaller 
loans during August , 19 66, they do not point out which borrowers suffered 
the burden of the loan decreases . Table 6 breaks down the all loans 
category by loan size to isolate the different i al effects o f r at i oning . 
The greatest percentage decrease in numbe r loaned and in dollars loaned 
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occurred in the $5,500 - and - over loan group indicating that customers 
r equesting lnrge loans bor e the brunt of r ationing by loan size . 
Table 6 . Breakdown of loans by size 
% of No . Loaned % of Dollars Loaned 
Loan Size 1966 1964 1966 1964 
$ 500 - 1499 44 . 7 48 . 6 13 .4 11. 6 
1500 - 2499 21.4 12 . 9 14 .4 8 . 3 
2500 - 3499 12.6 8 . 6 13 . 3 7 . 7 
3500 - 4499 4 . 9 5 .7 6 . 6 7 . 1 
4500 - 5499 8 .7 4 . 3 16 . 6 6 . 5 
5500 and over 7. 8 20 . 0 35 .7 58 .7 
Shorter maturities 
Another hypothesized method of non- price ration ing is the shor t ening 
of matur ities on loans . This will cause incr eased turnover in loans and 
allow the bank to accommodate more customers . If shorter maturities are 
gra nted , the average maturi t ies for loans should decrease . Table 7 shows 
the average maturi t y values for t he two test periods . Average maturities 
decreased by 16 . 6% for all loans and 4 . 5% for business loans . The 
weighted average values decreased by 13 . 9% for all loans bu t increased 
by 13.2% for business loans . 
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Table 7 . Loan maturities at the test bank 
All Loans Business Loans 
Test St:atistic 1966 1964 1966 1964 
Ave. Maturity 5 .47 mo. 6 . 56 mo . 4.50 mo . 4. 71 mo . 
Wt. Ave . Maturity 
(by loan size) 5 . 44 6 . 32 4 . 80 4 . 24 
As in t he case of loan size , the average figures r ela te only part of 
the availability story. They do not specify which classes of bor rowers 
were most affect:ed by t:ight money . Table 8 classifies the change in 
average maturity of all loans by months. It is apparent that loans of 
12 month maturity and longer suffered the sharpest decrease from 1964 to 
1966. 
Table 8. Breakdown of loans by maturity 
% of No. Loaned % of Dollars Loaned 
Maturity 1966 1964 1966 1964 
0 - 2 . 9 mo. 23 . 3 21.4 14 . 8 24 . 2 
3 - 5.9 26.2 28.6 30 . 3 31 .. 8 
6 - 8.9 24 . 3 18 . 6 36 . 5 11. 1 
9 - 11. 9 2 . 9 0.0 1. 6 0 . 0 
12 and over 23.3 31. 4 16 . 9 32.9 
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CHAPTER V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
It is apparent f r om intervi ews with the bank ' s officers and from 
the statistical analysis that the test bank did engage in cr edit ration -
ing along non - price lines during the particular tight money period 
a nalyzed . In general, higher credit standards were r equired , smaller 
l oans were rnade, and shorter maturities were granted . I t is not clear 
from t he statistical analysis that rationing was carried out on the basis 
of the strength of the customer r elationship, although the bank ' s officers 
indicated that the accommodation of established customers was a prime 
goal of the bank. 
Tables 9 and 10 summarize the movements in test statistic values 
for all loans and business loans and relate these movements to t hose 
hypothesized by the availability doctr i ne . The doctrine is most con-
vincingly supported by the changes in the test statis tic values for all 
loans . The test value changes moved in the hypothesized direction in 
12 out of 15 cases . In the business loans classification, the values 
moved in the cor r ect dir ection in 10 of 15 instances . 
More specifically, the substantial increase in the average current 
ratios from 1964 to 1966 , coupled with the support of larger amoun t s of 
net worth per dollar loaned and loans outstanding , testifies that higher 
standards of cr editworthiness were r equ ired in the tight money period . 
This trend is confirmed by the general increase in credit rati ng levels 
in 1966 . The bank apparently did no t, however, require increased 
security on loans dur ing the tight money month . 
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T3ble 9 . Summary of test statistic values for all loans 
Confor m to 
Hypot:he sis Test Statistic 1966 1964 % Change Hypothesis 
Ave . Credit Rating 3 .45 3 . 25 + 6 . 2 Yes 
Wt . Ave . Credit 
Rating (by loan size) 3 . 57 3 . 55 + 0 . 6 Yes 
Ave . Current Ratio 4 . 66 3 . 15 +47 . 9 Yes 
Raise Wt . Ave . Curren t 
Ratio (by loan size) 4 .49 3 . 18 +41. 2 Yes 
Credit 
Ave . (Loan/NW) 0 . 06 0 . 11 -45 . 5 Yes 
Standar ds 
Ave . (Total Loans/NW) 0 . 14 0 . 17 - 17 . 6 Yes 
Secured $ I Total $ 
Loaned 0 . 50 0 . 62 - 19 .4 No 
if Secured Loans I 
Tot al 1f Loans 0 .49 0 . 57 - 14 .0 No 
Ave . (Loan/Min. Bal.) 65.15 87. 18 - 25. 3 Yes 
Satisfy 
Ave . Length Customer 
Established Relationship 3 . 14 3 . 01 + 4 . 3 Yes 
Customers Wt . Ave. Length 
(by loan size) 3 . 15 3 . 21 - 1. 9 No 
Decrease Ave . Loan Size ($) 2 , 637 3 , 145 - 16 . 2 Yes 
Loan Size Wt . Ave. Loan Size 
(by credit r a ting) 2, 693 4,038 - 33 . 3 Yes 
Decrease Ave . Maturity (mo . ) 5 .47 6 . 56 - 16 . 6 Yes 
Maturity Wt . Ave . Maturity 
(by loan size) 5 .44 6 . 32 - 13 . 9 Yes 
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Table 10 . Summary of test statistic values fo r business loans 
Hypothesis 
Raise 
Credit 
Standards 
Test Statistic 
Ave . Credit Rating 
Wt . Ave . Credit 
Ra~ing (by loan size) 
Ave . Current Ratio 
Wt . Ave . Current 
Ratio (by loan size) 
Ave . (Loan/NW) 
Ave . (Total Loans/NW) 
Secured $ / To t al $ 
Loaned 
# Secured Loans / 
Total ff Loans 
1966 1964 
3 . 28 2 . 93 
3 . 55 3 .44 
4 . 87 3 . 53 
4 . 65 3 . 56 
0 . 06 0 .08 
0 . 17 0 . 12 
0 .42 0.44 
0 .46 0 .44 
Ave . (Loan/Min . Bal . ) 93 . 35 128 .05 
Satisfy 
Ave . Length Customer 
Established Relationship 
Customers Wt . Ave . Length 
(by loan size) 
Decrease Ave . Loan Size ($) 
Loan Size Wt . Ave . Loan Size 
(by credit rating) 
Decrease Ave . Maturity (mo . ) 
Matur ity Wt. Ave . Maturity 
(by loan size) 
3 . 29 3 .47 
3 . 29 3 . 62 
3 , 563 3 , 683 
3,947 4 , 630 
4 .50 4 . 71 
4 . 80 4 . 24 
Conform to 
% Change Hypothesis 
+11 . 9 Yes 
+ 3 . 2 Yes 
+38 . 0 Ye s 
+30 . 6 Yes 
- 25 . 0 Yes 
+41.6 No 
- 4 . 5 No 
+ 4 . 5 Yes 
- 27 . 1 Yes 
- 5 . 2 No 
- 9 . 1 No 
- 3 . 3 Yes 
- 14 . 7 Yes 
- 4 . 5 Yes 
+13 . 2 No 
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Tile analysis suggests that borrowers carried a l a r ger mi nimum 
balance per dollar loaned during August, 1966 , but average length of 
the customer relationship was not convincingly highe r during that time . 
Thus, it is not statistically clear whether the bank gave pr efer e ntial 
treatment to established customers during this tight money episode . 
The movement in loan size and maturity for the all loans category 
offers a much more conv incing argument for rationi ng . Loans were scaled 
back and maturities shor tened during August, 1966 . Borrowers requesting 
large loans and maturities over 12 months were especially frustrat ed by 
t he cred j t restraint . 
Specia l significance should be attached to the movement of the 
averages for business loans as compared to all loans . Tables 9 and 10 
offer this contrast. 
The average current ratios for both all loans and business loans 
increased from 1964 to 1966 , but the percentage increase for busines s 
loans was less than that for all loans . This indicates that businesses 
faced more lenient creditworthiness standards than did personal l oan 
customers . Similarly loan size for both all loans and business loans 
decreased, but the percentage decrease in business loan size was much 
smaller than that for all loans, showing that personal loans had been 
more severely cut back in size to allow accommodat ion of the business 
borrowers . Finally , maturities for all loans decreased by a gr eater 
percentage than maturities for business loans - - once again indicating 
that commercial customers we re satisfied at the expense of those indi -
viduals making personal loans. 
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Although this study indicates that credit rationing occurred at 
this particular bank dur ing one particular tight money per iod, it is 
not appropriate to make inferences about the general response of this 
bank to tight money or about the r esponse of other banks to the August, 
1966, tigh t money period . Nonetheless, this study does offer some 
insight into the validity of the explanations and theories of credit 
availability reviewed in Chapter II . 
The Hodgman model, which stressed the profitability of the customer 
relationship and the effect of the prime rate convention, is substan-
tiated in its implication that credit will be rationed on the basis of 
loan size . The convincing degree of credit rationing along non- price 
lines at this bank , on the other hand, questions the contention of Kane 
and Malkiel that r ationing will not take place during tight money . It 
·'< 
is evident that L' customers at the test bank were satisfi.ed, not by 
selling government securities to obtain loanable funds , but rather , by 
cutting marginal borrowers out of the market and by decreasing loan sizes 
and shortening maturities . Finally, Luckett ' s theoretical construct 
calling for increased standards of creditworthiness during periods of 
monetary restraint is supported by the study . 
It should be emphasized again that dangers exist in making general 
conclusions or evaluations based on a case study . An analysis involving 
many more banks and additional tight money periods would be necessary to 
appr opriately test t he validity of the availability doctrine . 
Hopefully , this thesis will encourage further and more extensive 
work in the availability area . 
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